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 Background: Board of directors is entrusted with responsibilities to monitor operations 
of firms. Therefore, the board should have effective characteristics to ensure the interest 
of shareholders is protected. In view of that, Code of Corporate Governance was issued 
in Malaysia in 2000 to strengthen the board. Objective: This paper examines board 
size, one of the board’s characteristics, to assess whether it is big or small board that 
produces high quality financial reporting. In particular, it examines the effect of board 
size on the level of accounting conservatism for Malaysian firms listed on Bursa 
Malaysia. Accounting conservatism is an important element in good quality financial 
reporting Sample of this study consists of 3,852 firm-year observations of non-financial 
firms over the period 2001-2012. Results: From the analysis, results reveal that the 
level of accounting conservatism is higher for firms with small board size. Conclusion: 
With respect to financial reporting quality, board of directors is more effective when the 
number of board members is small.  
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INRODUCTION 
 
 The central monitoring and controlling system of a firm is the board of director (Fama and Jensen, 1983). It 
is entrusted with responsibilities to oversee operations of firm and to ensure the interest of shareholders is 
protected. Corporate governance provides mechanisms for the board of director to govern the operations of firm 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). In Malaysia, the Code of Corporate Governance was first issued in March 2000. A 
revised version of the Code was released in 2007 which aims at strengthening the board of directors and audit 
committees, and ensuring that the board of directors and audit committees discharge their roles and 
responsibilities effectively. The Code has improved the perception of investors towards the standard of 
corporate governance (KLSE-PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2002). Prior studies in Malaysia that examine board 
characteristics find that board characteristics affect the quality of financial reporting. Mohd. Salleh, Mohd. 
Iskandar and Rahmat (2005) report that duality is positively related to earnings management. Duality refers to 
one person who assumes the roles of CEO (Chief Executive Officer) and Chairman. Abdul Rahman and 
Mohamed Ali (2006) find that larger board size is not effective as higher earnings management is observed in 
firms with large board size.  
 In this paper we extend prior studies to examine the association of board size with accounting conservatism. 
Accounting conservatism is an important element in good quality financial reporting (Ball, Robin, and Wu, 
2003; Beekes, Pope, and Young, 2004; Fan and Wong, 2002). It is argued that accounting conservatism is an 
effective mechanism for the board of directors to address agency problem (Watt, 2003; Ahmed and Duellman, 
2007). Our results show that accounting conservatism is observed in Malaysian listed firms. Furthermore, the 
results show that there is a difference in the level of accounting conservatism between firms with large board 
size and firms with small board size. Higher accounting conservatism is observed in firms with small board size. 
As far as accounting conservatism is concerned, our results suggest that board of director with small number of 
member monitors better the quality of financial reporting.  
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews prior studies and develops the hypothesis. 
Section 3 discusses the research method and Section 4 presents the results and discussions. Section 5 is the 
conclusion.  
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Literature Review and Hypothesis Development: 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance: 
 Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance was first issued in March 2000. The Code essentially aims to 
encourage disclosure by providing adequate, timely and relevant information to the investing public to facilitate 
the making of informed investment decisions and to evaluate firms’ performance. The Code sets out principles, 
best practices on structures and processes that firms may use in their operations towards achieving the optimal 
governance framework. It comprises of four parts, namely principles of corporate governance, best practices in 
corporate governance, principles and best practices for other corporate participants and the explanatory notes. 
The principles underlying the Code focus on four areas, including board of directors, director’s remuneration, 
shareholders and accountability and audit. A revised version of the Code was released in 2007. Key 
amendments to the revised Code are aimed at strengthening the board of directors and audit committees, and 
ensuring that the board of directors and audit committees discharge their roles and responsibilities effectively. 
The amendments spell out the eligibility criteria for the appointment of directors and the role of the nominating 
committee.  
 
Accounting conservatism:  
 Accounting conservatism recognizes economic losses immediately in the financial statements, but it 
requires higher verification standards for recognition of economic gains. It is argued that accounting 
conservatism is an effective mechanism to reduce agency problem as it curbs managers’ opportunistic 
behaviour. It reduces the ability of managers to overstate earnings and net assets (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; 
Watts, 2003). Prior research indicates that accounting conservatism is associated with high quality financial 
reporting. For example, Beekes et al. (2004) find that accounting conservatism is higher for firms that have 
good corporate governance mechanisms. Firms with a higher proportion of outside directors recognize losses on 
a timelier basis than firms with fewer outside directors. Ahmed and Duellman (2007) obtain similar results. 
They report that accounting conservatism is high for firms with high percentage of outside directors’ 
shareholdings. For firms with high percentage of inside directors’ shareholdings, accounting conservatism is 
low. Lara, Osma and Penalve (2009) report that firms with stronger corporate governance have higher degree of 
accounting conservatism. LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) and Cullinan et al. (2012) find that accounting 
conservatism is negatively associated with managerial ownership.  
 
Board size:  
 Board size refers to the number of board members. The size of the board is important as it influences the 
extent to which the board is able to reach consensus and take advantage of the knowledge and expertise of the 
individuals. Jensen (1993) suggests that a board should have a minimum of seven or eight members to function 
effectively. However, to date, there is still no consensus over the size of the board that best govern a firm. It is 
argued that large board is more effective as large board has more external linkage and expertise. Furthermore, 
large board has more capabilities and resources to solve group tasks (Dalton et al., 1999; Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1993; Pierce and Zahra, 1992). On the other hand, another competing view in the literature suggests 
that small board is more effective than large board as a small number of individuals is likely to agree on a 
particular outcome (Lange et al., 2000) and to engage in genuine interaction and debate (Firstenberg and 
Malkiel, 1994). It is also argued that large board is value reducing because large members make coordination, 
communication and decision making more complicated and, hence, less efficient (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg, 
Sundgren and Wells, 1998; Forbes and Miliken, 1999; Gladstein, 1984; Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Shaw, 1981).  
 Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance suggests that the number of board members should be 
appropriately determined for the board to be effective. In Malaysia, studies provide mixed results with regard to 
the relationship between board size and financial reporting quality. Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2006) 
find that earnings management is higher for firms with large board size. On the contrary, Mohd. Saleh et al. 
(2005) report that there is no relationship between earnings management and board size. 
 In view of that prior studies do not provide conclusive evidence on the effect of board size on financial 
reporting quality, and that the Malaysian Code of Governance is silent on the number of board members, we do 
not predict any direction with regard to the relationship between board size and accounting conservatism. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that there is a relationship between accounting conservatism and board size.  
 
Research Method:  
 The sample consists of 3,852 firm-year observations of non-financial firms listed on Bursa Malaysia over 
the period 2001-2012. Data are retrieved from the Datastream database. To be included in the sample, firms 
must have available data to compute earnings and stock returns. We exclude observations with missing values.  
 We use Basu’s (1997) measure as our measure of conservatism. Basu defines conservatism as earnings 
capture bad news faster than good news. Using stock returns to proxy for good and bad news, Basu expected 
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that in a reverse regression of earnings on stock returns, a higher association of earnings with negative stock 
returns than with positive stock returns would be observed. Basu’s regression model is as follow: 
 
Et = β0 + β1Dt + β2Rt + β3DtRt +еt         (model 1) 
 
 where Et is annual earnings deflated by the beginning of period market value, Rt is a twelve-month stock 
return, Dt is a dummy variable that equals one if stock return is negative and equals zero otherwise, and is the 
residual term. The coefficient β3 measures the sensitivity of earnings to negative stock returns and it is expected 
to be positive and significant when earnings are more sensitive to negative stock returns than to positive stock 
returns. We extend the Basu (1997) model by including the variable for board size to examine the association of 
board size with accounting conservatism. The estimating equation is as follow:  
 
Et = β0 + β1Dt + β2Rt + β3DtRt + β4SIZEt + β5SIZEt.Dt + β6SIZEt.Rt + β7SIZEt.Dt.Rt + еt   (model 2)  
 
 SIZE represents board size that equals one when the number of board members is above the sample median 
and equals zero otherwise. The coefficients on SIZE*D*R is expected to be statistically significant when the 
level of accounting conservatism is different between firms with large board size and firms with small board 
size. 
 
Results: 
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for variables earnings, stock return and board size. Earnings have 
mean value of 0.069 and median value of 0.076. The minimum and maximum values for earnings are -0.580 and 
0.596, respectively. The mean value for stock return is 0.104 and the median value is 0.019. Stock return has a 
minimum value of -0.891 and the maximum value of 4.584. The mean for board size is 7.7 and the median is 7. 
Board size has minimum and maximum members of 4 and 21, respectively. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. 
Variables Mean Median First quartile Third quartile Minimum Maximum 
E 0.069 0.076 0.034 0.123 -0.580 0.596 
R 0.104 0.019 -0.169 -0.263 -0.891 4.584 
SIZE 7.7 7 6 9 4 21 
E is annual earnings deflated by the beginning of period market value, R is a twelve-month stock return measured from eight months prior to 
the fiscal year through four months after the fiscal year end and SIZE is the number of board members.  
 
 Table 2 presents results of pooled cross-sectional regressions. In model 1, D*R captures difference in the 
sensitivity of earnings to negative stock returns. The coefficient on D*R is 0.125 and it is positive and 
statistically significant. The result provides evidence the existence of accounting conservatism. Model 2 
includes variable SIZE and its interaction with D and R. SIZE*D*R seeks to capture difference in the level of 
accounting conservatism between firms with large board size and firms with small board size. The coefficient on 
SIZE*D*R is -0.095 and statistically significant, suggesting that there is a difference in the level of accounting 
conservatism between firms with large board size and firms with small board size. As the coefficient on 
Size*D*R is negative and statistically significant, it indicates that firms with small board size have higher level 
of accounting conservatism than firms with large board size. To check the sensitivity of our results, we re-
estimate model 1 and model 2 using a fixed effect analysis to control for the effect of time period. We obtain 
similar results. 
 
Table 2: Regression Results for Earnings on Stock Returns and Board Size. 
 Model 1a Model 2b 
Intercept 0.078*** 
(0.000) 
0.068*** 
(0.000) 
D 0.004 
(0.464) 
0.007 
(0.415) 
R 0.017** 
(0.013) 
0.019 
(0.109) 
D*R 0.125*** 
(0.000) 
0.158*** 
(0.000) 
SIZE  0.016** 
(0.016) 
SIZE*D  -0.010 
(0.355) 
SIZE*R  -0.002 
(0.864) 
SIZE*D*R  -0.095** 
(0.012) 
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**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.  
(figures in the parentheses are the p-values)  
a Et = β0 + β1Dt + β2Rt + β3DtRt + et  
b Et = β0 + β1Dt + β2Rt + β3DtRt + β4SIZEt + β5SIZEt.Dt + β6SIZEt.Rt + β7SIZEt.Dt.Rt + et  
Et is annual earnings deflated by the beginning of period market value, Rt  is a twelve-month stock return measured from eight months prior 
to the fiscal year through four months after the fiscal year end, Dt is a dummy variable that equals one if stock return is negative and equals 
zero otherwise, SIZE represents board size that equals one when the number of board members is above the sample median and equals zero 
otherwise, and εt is the residual term.  
 
 Overall, we provide evidence that Malaysian listed firms produce high quality financial reporting, and that 
the quality of financial reporting is affected by board size. It appears that the number of board members is an 
important factor to influence the quality of financial reporting. Small board size is more effective in monitoring 
the quality of financial reporting. The results support the view that small board size monitor better the quality of 
financial reporting (Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali, 2006). 
 
Conclusion: 
 This study examines accounting conservatism and the effect of board size on the level of accounting 
conservatism for Malaysian firms listed on Bursa Malaysia. The results obtained from 3,852 firm-year 
observations over the period 2001-2012 indicate the existence of accounting conservatism, suggesting that 
Malaysian listed firms produce high quality financial reporting. Furthermore, the results indicate that there is a 
difference in the level of accounting conservatism between firms with small board size and firms with large 
board size. Higher accounting conservatism is observed in firms with small board size, suggesting that small 
board size is more effective in monitoring the quality of financial reporting.  
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